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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j). The Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the 
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, thereby 
conferring jurisdiction on this Court pursuant to Utah Code section 78a-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the 2002 Declaration1 of covenants, 
conditions and restrictions for Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch was void ab initio. 
Standard of Review: Whether a party complied with the terms of a contract is a 
question of fact, reviewed for clear error. Saudners v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). "Questions of contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence" 
are matters of law, which are reviewed for correctness. Zions First Nat 'IBank, N.A. v. Nat 7 
Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988). 
Preservation of Issue: The Association2 does not dispute that Sky Ranch3 preserved 
this issue below. 
1
 As used herein, the "2002 Declaration" shall refer to the Second Restated 
Supplementary and Amended Declaration of Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions for 
Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch, a Planned Development in Washington County, Utah. R. 375a, 
Ex. 6. 
2
 As used herein, the "Association" shall refer to Plaintiff/Appellee Grassy Meadows 
Sky Ranch Landowners Association. 
3
 As used herein,"Sky Ranch" shall refer to Defendant/Appellee Grassy Meadows 
Airport, Inc.; Sky Ranch Development, Inc.; and Michael O. Longley, collectively. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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2. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that Sky Ranch's claim for tortious 
interference failed as a matter of law. 
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court correctly granted judgment as a matter 
of law is reviewed for correctness. Archuleta v. Galetka, 2008 UT 76, \ 6, 197 P.3d 650. 
Preservation of Issue: The Association does not dispute that Sky Ranch preserved 
this issue below. 
3. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that Sky Ranch was not entitled to 
terminate the Airport Lease Agreement based upon the evidence presented at trial. 
Standard of Review: Whether a party complied with the terms of a contract is a 
question of fact, reviewed for clear error. Saudners, 793 P.2d at 931. 
Preservation of Issue: The Association does not dispute that Sky Ranch preserved 
this issue below. 
4. Whether the trial court properly adjudicated the entirety of Sky Ranch's breach 
of contract claim, including its allegation that the Association had failed to pay certain lease 
payments. 
Standard of Review: Whether an issue is properly before the trial court is a question 
of law, reviewed for correctness. Lee v. Sanders, 2002 UT App 281, j^ 6, 55 P.3d 1127. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was not raised in Sky Ranch's docketing statement, 
but the Association does not dispute that Sky Ranch preserved it below. 
o 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
There are no constitutional provisions or determinative statutes that are determinative 
or of central importance to the issues raised in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case. 
At its core, this case is about retaliation. This case arises out of Sky Ranch's desire 
to retake control over the airstrip it had leased to the Association and transform the Grassy 
Meadows development, a sleepy community surrounding a private and restricted airstrip 
nestled in a remote area of Hurricane, Utah, into a bustling hub of commercial activity. For 
more than a decade, Sky Ranch, as the developer of Grassy Meadows, and the Association, 
comprising the homeowners and landowners of Grassy Meadows, coexisted peacefully. Sky 
Ranch leased the airstrip, which it had constructed to be the centerpiece of the community, 
to the Association, and, in return, the Association maintained it in good operating condition. 
See Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Airport Lease Agreement ("Lease"), R. 375a, Ex. 1. 
Then, in approximately 2002, Sky Ranch began to take steps that would radically alter 
and forever change the nature of the community. Sky Ranch had grand plans to expand the 
"Fixed Base Operations" at the airstrip to include restaurants, stores, maintenance facilities 
and even hotels to cater to a greatly expanded number of authorized airport users flying a 
greatly expanded category of authorized aircraft. To accomplish this transformation, Sky 
Ranch unilaterally filed and recorded a new declaration of covenants, conditions and 
restrictions, which disenfranchised the Association, allowing Sky Ranch to effect these 
changes in the community unchecked. 
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Concerned about Sky Ranch's unabashed power-grab and the radical changes the new 
declaration would cause to the nature of their quiet community, and believing Sky Ranch no 
longer had the authority to amend the declaration unilaterally, the Association challenged the 
declaration's validity. The Association and its members also resisted Sky Ranch's efforts to 
change zoning ordinances to effect its plan. Irate at the Association's opposition to its efforts 
to overhaul the community and retake control of the airstrip, Sky Ranch sent the Association 
a notice of its intent to terminate the Lease. The notice alleged that the Association had been 
deficient in maintaining the airstrip. This was the first time the Association had received 
such a notice since entering into the Lease more than a decade before. 
II. The Course of Proceedings, 
After receiving Sky Ranch's notice terminating the Lease, the Association filed a 
peremptory lawsuit to protect its right to continue to use the airstrip. Sky Ranch responded 
by filing numerous counterclaims and cross-claims. Seven years of litigation ensued. After 
extensive and protracted litigation, including a number of dispositive motions, the issues that 
were ultimately tried were relatively simple and straightforward: (1) whether Sky Ranch had 
the authority to record the 2002 Declaration or whether the 2002 Declaration was void; (2) 
whether the Association tortiously interfered with the legitimate business interests of Sky 
Ranch by opposing proposed zoning ordinance changes affecting the Association; and (3) 
whether the airstrip Lease was materially breached by the Association and then properly 
terminated by Sky Ranch or whether the Lease remains in full force and effect. R. 746 at 2. 
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III. Disposition in the Trial Court. 
The case was tried before the Honorable G. Rand Beacham sitting without a jury on 
April 19 and 20, 2010. Following the trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the 
Association on each of the issues tried. R. 746 at 3. 
IV. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issue Presented. 
The following facts comprise a summary of the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law entered on August 6, 2010: 
1. The Grassy Meadows Sky Ranch Planned Development is a planned residential 
development near Hurricane, Utah, consisting of lots with access to a private, restricted 
airstrip. 
2. The airport is the centerpiece of the Community and the primary purpose for 
which the Community was built. 
3. In order to ensure the Association access to the airport, Sky Ranch entered into 
a 99-year lease with the Association on November 25, 1990, pursuant to which the 
Association became the "exclusive occupant" of the Airport. 
4. The Lease contains a termination provision, which can only be invoked after 
the lessor follows certain specific procedures outlined in the Lease. 
5. Sky Ranch drafted and recorded a declaration of covenants, conditions and 
restrictions for the Association on July 16,1990 (the " 1990 Declaration"), which superceded 
a similar declaration it had previously drafted and recorded. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6. The 1990 Declaration allows the declarant, Sky Ranch, to amend the 
declaration unilaterally during a specified period of time until 80 percent of the lots in the 
Community have been sold. 
7. Any such amendment must accomplish at least one of three specifically 
enumerated purposes: "(i) to more accurately express the intent of any provision of [the 1990 
Declaration] in light of then existing circumstances, information or mortgagee requirements, 
(ii) to better insure, in light of then existing circumstances or information, workability of the 
arrangement which is contemplated by this Declaration; or (iii) to facilitate the practical, 
technical, administrative or functional integration of any additional tract of subdivision into 
the Community." R. 375a, Ex. 5 at art. XI, § 4 (pp. 26-27). 
8. In approximately June 2002, 75 of the 92 lots platted in the Community had 
been sold, bringing the number of lots sold in the Community to 81.5 percent. 
9. Soon thereafter, Sky Ranch unilaterally amended and restated the 1990 
Declaration. 
10. During this same time period, Sky Ranch had been laying the groundwork for 
an expanded fixed base operation ("FBO") area within the Grassy Meadows community and 
a new development ("Copper Rock") located adjacent to the community. 
11. Copper Rock had more than 1,600 planned lots and a 27-hole golf course. 
12. Sky Ranch wanted to provide access to the Grassy Meadows Airport to the 
future residents of Copper Rock, despite the 99-year lease that Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc. 
had entered into with the Association providing that the Association members would have 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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exclusive access to the Airport and despite the 1990 Declaration, which restricted access to 
the Airport to the owners of the up to 150 lots of the Grassy Meadows Community. 
13. To accomplish these development obj ectives, Sky Ranch included terms in the 
2002 Declaration that were dramatically different from key provisions of the 1990 
Declaration and added new provisions, none of which were mentioned, contemplated or 
addressed in any manner in the 1990 Declaration. 
14. Sky Ranch also inserted a number of terms that deprived the Association of its 
right to be self-governed by vesting control of the Association in Sky Ranch. 
15. The Association and its members resisted Sky Ranch's efforts to disenfranchise 
them and radically change the nature of their community. 
16. Almost immediately upon the heels of the Association's and its members' 
resistance, Sky Ranch sent a Notice of Termination of Lease dated March 31,2003 alleging 
various breaches of the Lease. 
17. The Notice of Termination was the first such notice Sky Ranch sent to the ( 
Association during the approximately 12 years that had passed since the parties had entered 
into the Lease. 
18. The Association denied any breach of the Lease as alleged by Sky Ranch, but 
nevertheless made concerted efforts to address the issues Sky Ranch brought to its attention 
i 
in order to attempt to appease Sky Ranch. 
19. Evidence presented at trial shows that the Association timely resolved any 
maintenance issues that needed to be addressed and that it has always substantially complied i 
with the terms of the Lease. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20. The Association has continued to use the airstrip since the Notice of 
Termination without incident or further complaint from Sky Ranch, just as it did prior to the 
Notice of Termination. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court correctly ruled that the 2002 Declaration was void ab initio. Sky 
Ranch no longer had the authority to amend the declaration unilaterally when it recorded 
2002 Declaration. Additionally, the 2002 Declaration did not comply with the amendment 
restrictions set forth in the 1990 Declaration, which require unilateral amendments to be 
consistent with the general plan and scheme of the community. The 2002 Declaration also 
constituted a brazen and improper attempt to disenfranchise the Association members of their 
right to vote on community affairs. Because Sky Ranch lacked the authority to file the 2002 
Declaration, it was void ab initio. 
2. Sky Ranch's claim for tortious interference fails as a matter of law. Tortious 
interference is a tort that applies only to contracts entered into by third parties. Sky Ranch's 
claim is based on a contract that it had allegedly entered into with the Association. Even if 
Sky Ranch could prove the existence of such a contract, and even if it could prove that the 
Association breached the same, Sky Ranch's cause of action would be for breach of contract, 
not tortious interference. Additionally, Sky Ranch is immune from any liability related to a 
tortious interference claim under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. As such, the trial court 
rightly dismissed Sky Ranch's tortious interference claim as a matter of law. 
3. The trial court correctly ruled that Sky Ranch was not entitled to terminate the 
Airport Lease Agreement. First, Sky Ranch failed to comply with the termination provisions 
Q 
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of the Lease. Second, the Association substantially complied with all its obligations under 
the Lease. Moreover, Sky Ranch failed in its duty to marshal all the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings. 
4. The trial court properly adjudicated all the issues related to Sky Ranch's breach 
of contract claim, including ruling that the Association was current in all its lease payments. 
Even though Sky Ranch did not put on any evidence at trial regarding lack of payment, Sky 
Ranch's counterclaim alleged that the Association had failed in this regard. Accordingly, the 
issue was properly before the trial court, and the court was obliged to resolve the same. In 
any event, Sky Ranch would be precluded from asserting lack of payment in a subsequent 
action given res judicata principles and its duty to assert all compulsory counterclaims. 
Thus, whether or not adjudicated by the trial court, Sky Ranch is precluded from asserting 
this issue again all the same. 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 2002 
DECLARATION WAS VOID AB INITIO. 
The trial court correctly ruled that the 2002 Declaration was void ab initio for three 
reasons: (1) Sky Ranch did not have the authority to amend the 1990 Declaration; (2) the 
2002 Declaration effected a drastic change to the character of the Grassy Meadows 
community; and (3) the 2002 Declaration disenfranchised the Association members of their 
right to control matters pertaining to their association. 
A. Sky Ranch Did Not Have the Authority to File the 2002 
Declaration. 
Sky Ranch's right to amend the 1990 Declaration terminated on June 11,2002. The 
1990 Declaration allowed the declarant to amend the declaration unilaterally "until eighty 
percent (80%) of the lots in the Development (including additional phases as may be added) 
have been sold to purchasers." R. 375a, Ex. 5 at art. XII, § 3 (p. 28). The trial court found 
this provision to be ambiguous because it was unclear whether the number of lots from which 
the 80 percent calculation would be made should include only the then-existing lots or all 
possible future lots. As the court explained "[t]he phrase, 'as may be added,' could be 
interpreted to include lots (1) 'as are permitted to be added in the future, no matter how many 
have already been added at any point in time,' or (2) 'as may have been added at any point 
in time, no matter how many may be permitted in the future.'" R. 741 at 19, f 3. 
The trial court concluded: "Because this language is susceptible to two different 
interpretations, it creates an ambiguity in the contract that must be construed against the 
drafter, in this case Mr. Longley [on behalf of Sky Ranch]." Id. at ^ 4 (citing U.S. Fid. And 
1 A 
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Guar. Cov. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 525 (Utah 1993); Culbertson v. Board of County 
Comm 'rs, 2001 UT 108,115, 44 P.3d 642). Consistent with fundamental rules of contract 
construction, the Court interpreted this provision to mean that once 80 percent of the platted 
and approved lots had been sold, Sky Ranch would no longer have the right unilaterally to 
amend the declaration. Id. at ^ 5. 
Evidence introduced at trial showed that as of June 2002 only 92 residential lots in the 
community had been platted and approved by Washington County.4 R. 741 at 4, j^ 18. On 
June 11, 2002, the seventy-fifth lot had been sold, bringing the number of lots sold in the 
community to 81.5 percent. Id. Accordingly, the trial court ruled that the 2002 Declaration, 
which Sky Ranch filed unilaterally on October 25, 2002, was void ab initio. 
Sky Ranch takes issue with this ruling, arguing that the trial court failed to harmonize 
the 80-percent limitation contained within the amendment provision with other provisions 
of the 1990 Declaration. Specifically, Sky Ranch argues that the trial court's interpretation 
of the 80-percent limitation contradicts an earlier provision stating that the developer could 
amend unilaterally until its right to annex land terminates. Brief of Appellant at 17 (citing 
R. 375a, Ex. 5 at art. XI, § 4 (pp. 26-27)). Sky Ranch concludes that the only interpretation 
that harmonizes all the provisions of the 1990 Declaration would be that the developer is 
allowed to amend unilaterally until "it has finished developing and 80% of the lots are sold." 
Brief of Appellant at 17. 
4
 Nor was any evidence admitted at trial showing that any additional lots were ever 
platted and approved thereafter. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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However, Sky Ranch's argument overlooks key language preceding the 80-percent 
limitation, which eliminates any possible contradiction between the two provisions 
addressing unilateral amendment. The introductory clause to the 80-percent limitation 
expressly states: "Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the contrary " R. 375a, 
Ex. 5 at art. XII, § 3 (p. 28). In other words, the 1990 Declaration specifically clarifies that 
there can be no contradiction with the 80-percent limitation because the limitation is to be 
read without regard to any other provision in the Declaration. Therefore, Sky Ranch's 
argument that the limitation needs to be harmonized with other, would-be contradictory 
provisions in the 1990 Declaration is belied by the express language of the declaration itself. 
Moreover, Sky Ranch's argument betrays a fundamental misapprehension of the trial 
court's ruling. Sky Ranch argues in essence that its interpretation of the 80-percent limitation 
is better than "the trial court's interpretation" and must therefore be adopted. Brief of 
Appellant at 18. However, the trial court never ruled which interpretation was the best 
interpretation, nor did it need to. Rather, the trial court simply recognized that there was 
reasonable support for both interpretations of the 80-percent limitation; hence, its conclusion 
that the provision was ambiguous. See Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, Tf 25,190 P.3d 1269 
("A contractual term or provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies.") (internal quotations omitted). 
Sky Ranch fails to explain in its brief why the trial court's allegedly less correct 
interpretation was not at least reasonable. Indeed, the interpretation adopted by the trial court 
is squarely supported by the express and unambiguous qualifying clause preceding the 80-
1? 
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percent limitation. Therefore, the trial court properly construed the 80-percent limitation 
against Sky Ranch in light of the inherent ambiguity contained within the provision and 
fundamental principles of contract construction.5 
B. The 2002 Declaration Is Void Because it Sought to 
Materially Change the Character of the Community. 
Even had Sky Ranch the authority to amend the 2002 Declaration unilaterally, the 
amendment would still be void because it was contrary to all three enumerated purposes that 
were supposed to advanced in order to justify unilateral amendment. The 1990 Declaration 
allowed the declarant to amend only 
(i) to more accurately express the intent of any provision of this Declaration 
in light of then existing circumstances, information or mortgagee requirements, 
(ii) to better insure, in light of then existing circumstances or information, 
workability of the arrangement which is contemplated by this Declaration; or 
(iii) to facilitate the practical, technical, administrative or functional
 ( 
integration of any additional tract of subdivision into the Development. 
R. 375a, Ex. 5 at art. XI, § 4 (pp. 26-27). In other words, the 1990 Declaration prohibited 
Sky Ranch from amending the declaration in any way that would "materially change the < 
character of the development." See Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, § 6.21 
(2000) (noting limitations to developer's power to amend declarations). Despite this 
prohibition, this is exactly what Sky Ranch did. Far from more accurately expressing the 
intent of the 1990 Declaration, the 2002 Declaration radically transforms the character of this 
i 
small residential community in a number of significant ways. 
5
 Sky Ranch clarified in the 2002 Declaration that the 80-percent limitation referred 
to all "150 lots in the development," not just those currently platted and approved. R. 375a, 
Ex. 6 at art. XII, § 3. (p. 32). That Sky Ranch felt this provision needed clarification by 
amendment repudiates its argument that the provision was unambiguous. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1. Greatly expanded commercial development. 
It was contemplated from the beginning that Sky Ranch would develop a limited 
commercial area that would include things such as a "fixed base operations" ("FBO") area 
for refueling airplanes and a limited number of hangars for aircraft storage. Thus, the 1990 
Declaration stated: 
Declarant may . . . conduct certain commercial operations on lands owned by 
it adjacent to the airstrip, including, but not limited to, fixed base operations 
for refueling aircraft and purposes incident thereto, construction and sale or 
leasing of aircraft storage and hanger [sic] space, scenic tour flights and such 
other business operations as it may deem necessary and appropriate; provided 
however, that any such commercial operations or activities conducted by the 
Declarant... shall he consistent with, and shall not unreasonably interfere or 
restrict the Owner's beneficial use and enjoyment of their Lots or the 
Property, as set forth in this Declaration. 
R. 375a, Ex. 5 at art. VII, § 6 (p. 18) (emphasis added). The key part of this section—and 
the part omitted from Appellant's Brief—is the last half of the paragraph, which provides a 
check on what would otherwise be close to unfettered power to engage in commercial 
development in any manner Sky Ranch "deem[ed] necessary and appropriate." 
In a blatant attempt to circumvent this check on power, Sky Ranch inserted a new 
definition of "FBO" into the 2002 Declaration to include, without limitation, "facilities for 
the sale of airplane fuel, a convenience store, lodging units ("casitas"), airplane repair 
facilities, airplane washing facilities, and any other related facilities deemed appropriate or 
desirable by the Declarant." R. 375a, Ex. 6 at art. I, § 13 (p. 4) (emphasis added). In 
addition to changing the nature of the limited commercial area contemplated by the 1990 
Declaration by adding such things as airplane repair facilities and commercial lodging, this 
definition eviscerates all other limitations that previously existed on Sky Ranch's power to 
1A 
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engage in commercial development. First, it greatly expands the qualifying standard of any 
proposed development from "necessary and appropriate" to "appropriate or desirable'' Id. 
Second, it drops the limitation to keep business development "consistent with" the 
Association members' "beneficial use and enjoyment of their" property. Id. Moreover, the 
impact of this wholesale change is exacerbated by the reservation of rights section, which 
states that Sky Ranch may wield its expanded right to engage in commercial development 
in any way "Declarant in its sole discretion deems to be appropriate" R. 375a, Ex. 6 at art. 
II (p. 6) (emphasis added). In other words, the 2002 Declaration makes it so Sky Ranch can 
engage in any commercial development it wants.6 
Other provisions further pave the way for a level of commercial development in the 
community never intended by the 1990 Declaration. First, the 2002 Declaration greatly 
expands the "additional land" that can be annexed into the development. In the 1990 
Declaration, Sky Ranch delineated a small part of "Section 28, Township 42 south, range 13 
West, SLB&M" as additional land that could be annexed. R. 375a, Ex. 5 at Exhibit B. In 
contrast, the 2002 Declaration opens up all land in Section 28 as well as Section 33 for 
annexation. R. 375a, Ex. 6 at Exhibit B ("[a]ny and all property .. . located within Sections 
28 and 33, Township 42 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian"). 
6
 Sky Ranch argues that it is "uncontested" that the Association agreed to at least some 
of these uses in agreement signed in 1994. Nothing could be further from the truth. Not only 
did the Association contest that such an agreement was ever made, the trial court sustained 
the Association's objection to admit a writing purported to be this agreement, as it was 
unsigned, unauthenticated and clearly not final (there were markings and edits all over the 
document). R. 754:104:15-105:6; 107:16-23; 113:16-18; 114:16-115:16; 116:22-117:7. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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This land expansion would probably not mean much absent an additional provision 
Sky Ranch added stating that "there is no restriction regarding the number of hangar and 
commercial units allowed." R. 375a, Ex. 6 at XI, § 2(a) (p. 30).7 The combination of these 
two provisions allows potentially hundreds more commercial lots to be built on an increased 
land area never contemplated by the 1990 Declaration. These provisions fundamentally alter 
the nature of what was supposed to be a small community with a very limited number of 
owners having exclusive access to a private airport. 
2. Transformation of airstrip character and role. 
The 2002 Declaration also broadens the definitions of "Lot" and "Member" to include 
hangars and hangar owners. R. 375a, Ex. 6 at art. I, § 16-17 (p. 5). This, coupled with the 
above-two provisions vastly increasing the total number of potential owners, allows 
potentially hundreds of additional people who do not even live at Grassy Meadows to use the 
' airstrip.8 This transforms what was supposed to be a private airstrip restricted to a limited 
number of users into the equivalent of a general aviation airport open to hundreds of 
additional users. This also escalates maintenance needs for the airstrip, thereby creating an 
7
 This not only directly undermines the lot limitation set forth in the 1990 Declaration 
("150 total lots"), but it is internally inconsistent with the clarification made in the 2002 
Declaration to the 80-percent limitation, which still presumes a maximum of 150 total lots 
in the development. Id. at art. XII, art. 3 (p.32) ("including proposed lots in additional 
phases, or in other words, 80% of the contemplated 150 lots in the development"). 
8
 Sky Ranch argues that this change simply "clarified" the voting rights of hangar 
owners as outlined in the "Phase 5C Declaration." Appellant Brief at 27. Sky Ranch's 
argument overlooks the fact that the Phase 5C Declaration defined only the rights of hangar 
owners in Phase 5C, not the owners of hangars located elsewhere in the development, 
including the vast land expansion. R. 375a, Ex. 36 at § 3. 
16 
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impermissible increased financial burden on the Association, which is responsible under the 
Lease for all airstrip maintenance. R. 375a, Ex. 1, § 8. 
3. Introduction of jet aircraft into the community. 
The 2002 Declaration also allows for the first time "the Declarant and any member, 
or any guests and invitees of the Declarant or any member, to land jets and large aircraft on 
the airstrip and park the same in the FBO area or on other property in the project." R. 375a, 
Ex. 6 at art. IV, § 4(k) (p. 11). Indeed, the 2002 Declaration removes any restriction 
whatsoever over the type of aircraft allowed to land and park in the community. Id. at art. 
IV, § 2 (allowing "aircraft of any type or size"). Previously, the Association was able to put 
appropriate restrictions on the type of aircraft that could land in the community. R. 375a, 
Ex. 5 at art. XII, § 2 (p. 27); R. 375a, Ex. 1, § 2. 
The deleterious effects of this sweeping change are profound. First, jet engines are 
significantly louder than propellers, prompting Sky Ranch to exclude the noise generated by 
such aircraft from the Association's right of quiet enjoyment. Id. at art. VII, §§8 and 22 (pp. 
22,24). The 2002 Declaration unilaterally waives this and any other legal right the members 
of the Association "otherwise may have had against use of the airstrip by . . . jet and large 
aircraft," including but not limited to any claims "related to any harm to person or property 
resulting from . . . noise, noxious fumes, or any other damage or harm." Id. 
Moreover, evidence introduced at trial established that the airstrip was not designed 
for and cannot accommodate jets, which are substantially heavier than propeller aircraft and 
require a much longer runway to land and takeoff safely. R. 375a, Ex. 16 (noting runway 
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was insufficient in terms of strength, length and geometry to handle aircraft weighing more 
than 10,000 pounds or "aircraft with high approach speeds"). 
Needless to say, none of these provisions more accurately expresses the intent of the 
1990 Declaration; rather, they effect a wholesale and illegitimate change in the nature of the 
community. In short, the trial court correctly ruled that Sky Ranch was prohibited from 
transforming what was intended to be a small residential community with limited commerical 
development into a bustling commercial hub with hotels, jet aircraft, hundreds of additional 
lots, hundreds of additional (non-resident) airstrip users and whatever other commercial 
development Sky Ranch "in its sole discretion" saw fit to develop. See, e.g., La Esperanza 
Townhome Ass'n, Inv. v. Title Sec. Agency, 689 P.2d 178, 181 (Ariz. App. 1984) (holding 
amended declaration allowing developer to construct multifamily homes in community 
designed for single family residences would upset "orderly plan" of community and was, 
therefore, void); Moore v. Megginson, 416 So. 2d 993 (Ala. 1982) (holding amendment 
allowing industrial warehouse and maintenance facility in residential community was "not 
in keeping with the area and neighborhood" and therefore void); Realty Growth Investors 
v. Council of Unit Owners, 453 A.2d 450 (Del. 1982) (holding developer's power to amend 
declaration did not include power to change total number of units specified in original 
declaration). 
C. The 2002 Declaration Disenfranchises Association Members. 
In addition to fundamentally altering the nature of the community, the 2002 
Declaration amounts to a power-grab by Sky Ranch resulting in the disenfranchisement of 
all the Association's members. The 1990 Declaration designated Sky Ranch as the "Class 
1Q 
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B Member" and all other members as either "Class A" or "Class C" members. R. 375a, Ex. 
5 at art. Ill, § 2 (pp. 6-7). Class A and C members were entitled to one vote for each lot 
owned by them, whereas the Class B member was entitled to five votes for each lot it owned. 
Id. This ensured that Sky Ranch would enjoy a majority of votes for an appropriate period 
of time to elect trustees and decide all other issues affecting the Association. E.g., id. at art. 
IV, § 4(d) (p. 9); art. V, § 4 (p. 10); art. VI § 2 (p. 13); art. VII, § 1 (p. 17); art. X, §§ 2 and 
10 (p. 23, 25); art. XII, § 3 (p. 27). Additionally, so long as it had Class B member status, 
Sky Ranch had the power to reject any proposed amendment to the declaration adopted by 
a majority vote of the members. Id. at art. XII, § 3 (p. 27). 
Sky Ranch was to lose its Class B status and become a Class A member, when either 
(1) the total number of votes held by Class A and C Members equaled the total number of 
votes held by Sky Ranch, or (2) the expiration of 15 years after the 1990 Declaration was 
recorded, whichever occurred first. Id. at art. Ill, § 2. This is a watershed moment under any 
such arrangement because the developer not only loses control, but the vast majority of its 
votes, as Class A members are entitled to only one vote per lot, not five. By the time Sky 
Ranch drafted the 2002 Declaration, the number of votes held by individual members of the 
Association equaled the number of votes held by Sky Ranch, and Sky Ranch had therefore 
lost its Class B member status and accompanying control over the Association. R. 754 at 
135:8, 17-22 (Mr. Longley testifying that he signed the Association's Bylaws, which 
acknowledged that Class B membership had terminated on or abut June 16, 1994). 
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1. Resurrecting Class B member status. 
The 2002 Declaration changed all this. First, Sky Ranch asserted that it now had 203 
lots compared to 77 held by the Association's members. R. 375a, Ex. 6 at art. Ill, § 2 (pp. 
7-8). Sky Ranch could have only come up with these numbers based on the altered voting 
scheme it instituted simultaneously discussed below. Sky Ranch then unilaterally declared 
that "notwithstanding any statement the Board of Trustees may have inserted in the Bylaws 
to the contrary, Declarant has Class B votes as of the of execution of this Declaration." R. 
375a, Ex. 6 at art. Ill, § 2 (pp. 7-8). Not only was this statement contrary to the 
acknowledgment in the Bylaws Mr. Longley signed himself, it was also contrary to the 1990 
Declaration, which unlike the 2002 Declaration, had no provision whereby the declarant 
could reassert its Class B member status once it expired. Compare R. 375a, Ex. 5 at art. Ill 
(pp. 6-7) with R. 375a, Ex. 6 at art. Ill, § 5 (p. 9). To dissuade anyone from challenging this 
unauthorized action, Sky Ranch further declared: "It shall be cause for automatic dismissal 
from membership on the Board of Trustees of the Association for board members to fail to 
recognize Declarant's votes, including those held in trust for Declarant." Id. 
2. Altering voting scheme to retain Class B member status. 
Having resurrected its Class B membership, Sky Ranch then sought to ensure that it 
would never again lose its control based on vote totals. Sky Ranch did this by (1) 
dramatically expanding the land area and commercial lot numbers of the Association, and 
(2) expanding the definition of "Lot" to include hangars, as discussed above in Part I.B.1. 
As owner of all these additional commercial and hangar lots, Sky Ranch greatly increased 
on 
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its number of votes, particularly in light of the vote multiplier afforded the Class B member.9 
Sky Ranch also extended the date when its Class B status will terminate regardless of vote 
totals by seven years. Compare R. 375a, Ex. 5, art. Ill, § 2 (b) (p. 7) with R. 375a, Ex. 6, art. 
Ill, § 2 (p. 8). By giving Sky Ranch hundreds of additional votes, the 2002 Declaration 
ensures that Sky Ranch will always be able to at least out vote the residents of the 
community, even after its Class B status eventually terminates. In this way, Sky Ranch not 
only illegitimately resurrected and then extended its ability to veto any community rules or 
declaration amendments passed by the Association, it ensured it would be able to exercise 
control over the entire community indefinitely, thus rendering the Association impotent and 
completely symbolic. 
3. Extension of Sky Ranch's power beyond Class B member rights. 
As if unilaterally reinstating and extending its Class B member power were not 
enough, the 2002 Declaration also gave Sky Ranch the right to promulgate and enforce its 
own rules and regulations for the Association in perpetuity and "the right to unconditionally 
veto" any rules or regulations promulgated by the Association for 15 years. R. 375a, Ex. 6 
at art. IV, § 4(i) (p. 11) and R. 375a, Ex. 6 at art. XII, § 2 (pp. 31-32). Although, the Lease 
gives Sky Ranch, as Lessor, the right to promulgate rules and regulations affecting the 
airstrip, no document prior to the 2002 Declaration gave Sky Ranch the power to promulgate 
rules and regulations affecting the entire community. R. 375a, Ex. 1, § 2. Rather, the 1990 
Declaration made it clear that this right was within the exclusive province of the Association. 
9
 The 2002 Declaration also made it so that Sky Ranch could "vot[e] all or any portion 
of [its Class C votes] as Class B votes" in its "discretion." R. 375a, Ex. 6, art. Ill, § 2 (p. 8). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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R. 375a, Ex. 5 at art. XII, § 2 (p. 27). Moreover, the 2002 Declaration makes it so any rule 
Sky Ranch adopts regarding the airstrip will trump any inconsistent rule adopted by the 
Association in perpetuity. R. 375a, Ex. 6 at art. XII, § 2 (p. 32). 
Similarly, the 2002 Declaration allows Sky Ranch for the first time to "charge 
reasonable admission and other fees of Association Members for the use of the airstrip . . . 
." Id. at art. IV, § 4(d). This effected a unilateral and unauthorized amendment to the Lease 
entered into with the Association, which set forth specifically what the lease payments would 
be and did not give Sky Ranch the authority to charge additional use fees. R. 375a, Ex. 1. 
Sky Ranch attempts to justify this illegitimate provision by arguing: "While this language 
seems vague, it seems unlikely that it would give Sky Ranch a right to charge fees for the use 
of the airstrip " Brief of Appellant at 33. In fact, there is nothing at all ambiguous about 
this provision, which specifically refers to "the Declarant," or, in other words, Sky Ranch, 
having this power. R. 375a, Ex. 6, art. IV, §4(d) (p. 10). 
Sky Ranch culminated its power-grab by littering the 2002 Declaration with a number 
of provisions requiring the automatic dismissal of board members for acting in any way 
contrary to Sky Ranch's desires. As discussed above, the 2002 Declaration requires the 
automatic dismissal of trustees for challenging Sky Ranch's unauthorized reinstatement of 
Class B member status. It also requires automatic dismissal for the following: (1) failing to 
maintain taxiways (as opposed to the airstrip), even though the taxiways are privately owned, 
some by Sky Ranch itself, R. 375a, Ex. 6 at art. VI, § 2 (p. 16); (2) refusing to sign Sky 
Ranch's proposed "addendum to the lease agreement," R. 375a, Ex. 6 at art. VI, § 5 (p. 19); 
and (3) allowing lawsuits by the Association against Sky Ranch, among other lawsuits, unless 
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approved by a super majority of members. R. 375a, Ex. 6 at art. V, § 2 (p. 12). Sky Ranch 
attempts to justify these extraordinary provisions by comparing them to in terror em clauses 
sometimes found in wills. However, there is a world of difference between a clause in a will 
designed to prevent family infighting resulting from dissatisfaction over one's inheritance 
and provisions set forth in a contract designed to chill a party's right to challenge illegal 
provisions in that contract. 
In short, the 2002 Declaration hijacked the Association's autonomy and made Sky 
Ranch (i.e., Mr. Longley) the supreme overlord of the Grassy Meadows community. 
Needless to say, this does not advance or more accurately express the intent of the 1990 
Declaration—it undermines it. Thus, this further confirms that the trial court correctly ruled 
that the 2002 Declaration is void. See Holiday Pines Prop. Owners Ass 'n v. Wetherington, 
596 So. 2d 84, 87-88 (Fla. Ct. App.) (voiding amendment undermining property owners' 
"right of individual control"). 
D. Sky Ranch Never Argued below to Have the Offending Provisions 
of the 2002 Declaration Severed, Nor Is Severance Practical. 
Finally, Sky Ranch asserts error on the trial court's part for failing to sever the 
offending provisions of the 2002 Declaration instead of declaring the entire document to be 
void. Sky Ranch is precluded from making this argument on appeal because it never made 
this argument below. It is fundamental that, "'in order to preserve an issue for appeal the 
issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity 
to rule on that issue.'" Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ^ 15, 164 P.3d 366 (citations omitted). 
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Here, the trial court never had an opportunity to consider this argument because Sky Ranch 
never raised it. Accordingly, Sky Ranch is precluded from raising it here. 
Additionally, if this Court were to sever each offending provision form the 2002 
Declaration it would be rendered meaningless. See, e.g., State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 191, 196 
(Utah 1999) (holding provisions may not be severed if it would render remaining provisions 
inoperable). This is not a case, for example, where an offending noncompete provision can 
be severed from an otherwise enforceable employment agreement. Severing all the offending 
provisions from the 2002 Declaration, which include the provisions governing membership 
and voting rights among many other key provisions discussed above, would leave nothing 
but a patchwork of isolated provisions having no continuity and giving no meaningful 
guidance to governance of the Association. As such, severance is simply not an option. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT RIGHTLY DISMISSED SKY RANCH'S CLAIM FOR 
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE. 
Sky Ranch argues that the trial court denied its due process rights by dismissing its 
tortious interference claim without an opportunity to be heard. In reality, the trial court 
dismissed the tortious interference claim only after being argued by both parties at the 
conclusion of trial. R.755 at 182:13—183:18;205:8—206:9. The trial court had earlier agreed 
to give Sky Ranch another day (essentially another chance) to produce evidence to prove a 
contract between Sky Ranch and the Association "if necessary." itf. at 171:10-23 (emphasis 
added). The need to schedule another day of trial was contingent on the court's rulings 
related to "the part of the trial [it had already] heard." Id. After considering the parties' 
respective proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court ruled that it was 
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"unnecessary to reconvene the trial to receive more evidence on this issue," because the 
Association could not be liable for tortious interference as a matter of law. R. 746 at 2 n. 1. 
The trial court's ruling was correct. "It is settled that one party to a contract cannot 
be liable for the tort of interference with contract for inducing a breach by himself or the 
other contracting party." Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. horn, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 
1982) (citations omitted). Sky Ranch sued the Association for opposing a change in zoning 
ordinances needed for Sky Ranch to expand the FBO area within the Grassy Meadows 
community. R. 489 at fflf 62-84. Sky Ranch alleged that the Association had previously 
agreed not to oppose Sky Ranch's efforts to expand the FBO area. Id. at ^ 66-67'. Instead 
of suing the Association for breaching this alleged agreement, however, Sky Ranch sued the 
Association for tortious interference of contract. No evidence Sky Ranch could offer at trial 
could remedy this fundamental flaw. Accordingly, Sky Ranch's argument on appeal that 
"the Association is attempting to avoid liability for breaching its contractual obligation . . . 
," Brief of Appellant at 32-33 (emphasis added), is of no avail because there is no claim for 
breach of contract at issue. For this reason alone, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
Additionally, a key element of tortious interference is lacking in this case even were 
tortious interference the correct cause of action under the circumstances. To prevail on a 
claim for tortious interference, a claimant must prove that the defendant interfered for "an 
improper puipose or by improper means." Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 304. In light of this 
element, Sky Ranch's claim fails on its face because the Association acted entirely within its 
rights in opposing the proposed zoning. Specifically, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine 
immunizes the Association and its members from liability that might otherwise arise from 
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petitioning the government, as in opposing zoning ordinance changes before a county 
planning commission. See Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, ^ 25, 116 P.3d 323 
(holding developer's tortious interference claim brought against individuals resisting zoning 
changes barred by Noerr-Pennington immunity). The Utah Supreme Court explained: 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees citizens the 
right to "petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. In recognition of this right, the United States Supreme Court has 
held that individuals and organizations are immune from liability under 
antitrust laws for actions constituting petitions to the government. See United 
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670, 85 S. Ct. 1585, 14 L. Ed.2d 
626 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 
U.S. 127, 138, 81 S. Ct. 523, 5 L. Ed.2d 464 (1961). Over the years, courts 
have extended this immunity doctrine, referred to as the Noerr-Pennington 
Doctrine, see R.A.V. v. City of St Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 420, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 
120 L. Ed.2d 305 (1992), to "protect. . . political activity against tort claims 
as well as antitrust claims," Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682,684 (Utah 1982). 
Id. at [^ 26; see also Kovac v. Crooked River Ranch Club and Maintenance Ass'n, 63 P.3d 
1197, 1200-01 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (holding homeowner association's actions in opposing 
homeowner's application for a conditional use permit amounted to nothing more than 
constitutionally protected participation in the political process and were therefore immune 
from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine."); Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d 
at 308 (reaffirming "constitutionally protected activity, like the exercise of First Amendment 
rights," absolves individuals of liability even if the improper purpose/unlawful means test 
is satisfied). 
Thus, even had the trial court committed some technical procedural error in dismissing 
Sky Ranch's tortious interference claim before Sky Ranch had finished putting on all its 
evidence in support of the existence of a contract between itself and the Association, such 
0£ 
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an error would be harmless given the above two reasons compelling dismissal of the claim 
as a matter of law. SeeJonesv. Cyprus Plateau Min. Cor/?., 944 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1997) 
("Harmless errors are those that are sufficiently inconsequential so no reasonable likelihood 
exists that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.") (citations omitted). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT SKY RANCH WAS NOT 
ENTITLED TO TERMINATE THE AIRPORT LEASE AGREEMENT. 
Frustrated with the Association's opposition to Sky Ranch's attempted power-grab 
and commercial development plans, Sky Ranch sought to terminate the Lease. Termination, 
or forfeiture, is a drastic remedy and consequently "not favored in the law." CommercialInv. 
Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105, 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Cache County v. Beus, 1999 
UT App 134,128, 978 P.2d 1043 ("Utah's courts have generally disfavored forfeitures in 
landlord-tenant cases"); Madsen v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1983) ("The 
undesirability of [forfeiture] is well-stated by the legal maxim that 'the law abhors 
forfeiture.'"). The trial court correctly held that forfeiture was not an appropriate remedy in 
this case for at least two independent reasons: (1) Sky Ranch failed to give the Association 
proper notice of its intent to terminate the lease and (2); the Association substantially 
complied with all its obligations under the Lease terms. Additionally, the trial court's 
findings should be affirmed because Sky Ranch failed in its duty to marshal all the evidence 
in support of the these findings. 
A. Sky Ranch Did Not Give the Association Proper Notice. 
In order to avail itself of the drastic remedy of forfeiture, a party must strictly comply 
with the contract's notice requirements. See, Siggard, 936 P.2d at 1109 (holding where 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
forfeiture is a possible remedy, person seeking forfeiture '"must comply strictly with the 
notice provisions of the contract.'") (emphasis in Siggard) (citations omitted). Here, the 
Lease required Sky Ranch to provide the Association with notice of any alleged breach and 
its intention to terminate the Lease in writing and sent via "certified letter, return receipt 
requested," to each member of the Association's Board of Trustees. R. 375a, Ex. 1, § 4. Sky 
Ranch failed to present any evidence at trial to show that it complied with this most basic 
contractual requirement. R. 741 at 22, fflf 20-21; R. 754-755. Because Utah law requires 
parties to "comply strictly" with all notice provisions of a contract, this failure alone confirms 
the correctness of the trial court's decision not to terminate the Lease. 
The correctness of the trial court's decision is further confirmed by the fact that Sky 
Ranch's notice was also deficient in other respects. The Utah Supreme Court has held that 
"forfeiture should be refused" when the notice is "indefinite or uncertain" as to the alleged 
breach that needs curing. See First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078, 1081 
(1983). Here, the Lease provided that Sky Ranch could not terminate the lease unless the 
Association failed to cure the alleged breach within 30 days of being given notice of the 
same. R. 375a, Ex. 1, § 4. With one exception, Sky Ranch failed to give sufficient notice 
to the Association in order to apprise it sufficiently what alleged breaches needed to be 
cured.10 
Sky Ranch specifically asserted that the Association was not current on its lease 
payments. The Association denied this allegation and Sky Ranch failed to produce any 
evidence at trial to substantiate this claim. R. 754-755. 
oo 
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For example, Sky Ranch alleged in the Notice of Termination (the "Notice") that "For 
a prolonged period of time, Lessee has failed to maintain the airstrip and runway lights 
anywhere near the same condition they were in when they were received, normal wear and 
tear excepted." R. 375a, Ex. 2 at 1. Yet nowhere in the Notice does Sky Ranch allege what 
specific maintenance issues needed to be corrected. Similarly, Sky Ranch wrote: "Lessee has 
failed to meet the necessary insurance requirements as outlined in section 10," Notice at 2, 
without specifying what specific insurance requirements it felt were lacking. Without 
knowing exactly what Sky Ranch claimed needed to be cured, the Association could not be 
expected to take appropriate remedial action, assuming that such action was even necessary. 
As the trial court noted, "A cure period is meaningless and of no effect if the lessee is not 
apprised specifically of the alleged problems that need curing." R. 741 at 22,123. 
B. The Association Substantially Complied with All Aspects 
of the Lease. 
Even had Sky Ranch strictly complied with the Lease's termination provision, 
termination would still not be an appropriate remedy in this case, because the Association 
substantially complied with all its obligations under the Lease. In furtherance of the policy 
disfavoring forfeiture, Utah courts look to see if a lessee has substantially, rather than strictly, 
complied with the terms of the Lease before considering termination. If the lessee has 
exercised good faith efforts to comply with the Lease, the "substantial compliance doctrine" 
instructs against terminating the Lease. Cache County v. Beus, 1999 UT App 134 at f^ 28. 
The Cache County court explained: 
[A]n overwhelming majority of courts [has] concluded, without reference to 
a specific statutory provision, that a Lease may not be forfeited for a trivial or 
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technical breach even where the parties have specifically agreed that "any 
breach" gives rise to the right of termination. These courts note the 
sophistication and complexity of most business interactions and are concerned, 
therefore, that the possibilities for breach of a modern commercial Lease are 
virtually limitless. In their view, the parties to the Lease did not intend that 
every minor or technical failure to adhere to complicated Lease provisions 
could cause forfeiture. Accordingly, nearly all courts hold that, regardless of 
the language of the Lease, to justify forfeiture, the breach must be "material," 
"serious," or "substantial." 
Id. at 35 (citations omitted). 
The court thus held that "a trial court should determine the materiality of the breach, 
and then decide whether the breaching party had substantially complied with the [lease]." 
Id. at f 36. Factors to be considered in determining the materiality of a breach are: 
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which 
he reasonably expected; 
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for the 
part of that benefit of which he will be deprived; 
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will 
suffer [from] forfeiture; 
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will 
cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any 
reasonable assurances; 
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer 
to perform comports with standards of good faith and fair dealing. 
Id. at \37 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 241 (1981)). 
Applying these factors to this case, it is obvious that the breaches by the Association, 
if any, were immaterial and not the kind that would justify the drastic remedy of forfeiture. 
1. Sky Ranch was not deprived of the benefits of its bargain. 
The benefits to which Sky Ranch was entitled under the lease included lease 
payments, having its property properly maintained and having its exposure to liability 
mitigated through insurance coverage. R. 375a, Ex. 1, §§ 3, 8 and 10. The trial court made 
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detailed factual findings supported by record evidence that the Association substantially 
complied with its contractual obligation to provide each of these benefits to Sky Ranch: 
33. The Notice of Termination was the first such notice Mr. Longley 
sent to the Association during the approximately 12 years that had passed since 
the parties entered in the Lease, [see Longley Testimony.] 
34. The only other letter Mr. Longley sent to the Association 
outlining alleged deficiencies regarding the Airport came one month prior to 
the Notice of Termination. [Longley Testimony; Exhibit 273.] 
35. It was only after the Association resisted Mr. Longley's efforts 
to amend the covenants, conditions and restrictions and zoning ordinances 
applicable to the community to facilitate his Copper Rock Development that 
Mr. Longley sent the Association any kind of written complaint about the 
Airport's maintenance or any other issue pertaining to the Airport. [Longley 
Testimony; Murdock Testimony.] 
36. The Association denied any breach of the Lease as alleged by 
Mr. Longley, but nevertheless made concerted efforts to address the issues Mr. 
Longley brought to its attention in order to attempt to appease Mr. Longley, 
including replacing all broken lights, removing weeds growing next to the 
Airport and addressing other minor maintenance issues. [Murdock 
Testimony.] 
38. Evidence presented at trial shows that the Association 
substantially complied with all the terms of the Lease. 
3 9. Although maintenance issues arose from time to time, including 
at the time the Notice of Termination was sent, such maintenance items fall 
within what would reasonably be expected as normal wear and tear of 
improvements on real property of this type. 
40. Nevertheless, the Airport was always in reasonably good 
working order and condition. [See Holt Testimony; McCarroll Testimony; 
Habberfield Affidavit; Murdock Testimony; Batson Affidavit; Santosuosso 
Affidavit.] 
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41. The Association engaged in regular and frequent maintenance, 
and even improvements, of the Airport throughout the lease period, including 
the following, among other things: 
a. added paint markings as an improvement to the Airport; 
b. funded an apron composed of crushed stone and sterilant 
pellets to be placed on each side of the Airport for the length of the 
airstrip to repair undercutting to the airstrip that had occurred; 
c. took measures to abate and remove weeds, including 
spraying and cleaning the Airport in March, July, August and 
September of 2003; 
d. kept the rail fences surrounding the Airport in good 
repair, including repairing them after they were damaged due to a 
lightning strike and automobile accident; 
e. kept most of the airport lights in good working condition, 
including repairing lights on taxiways, even though not required to do 
so by the Lease; and 
f paid to have portions of the Airport needing attention 
crack-sealed almost every year, including in 2000, 2001, 2002 and 
2003. 
[See Habberfield Affidavit at ffl[ 13, 14, 16-25, 33-35 and 38; Batson 
Affidavit at fflf 10-18 and 21; Santosuosso Affidavit at fflf 6, 9 and 18; 
McCarroll Testimony; Murdock Testimony.] 
42. Wayne Rogers, one of Mr. Longley's experts, testified that the 
Airport had "definitely" been maintained. [See Wayne Rogers testimony.] 
43. Mr. Rogers also testified that: 
g. asphalt inevitably shrinks and cracks due to 
environmental conditions; 
h. the cracking he observed at Grassy Meadows was 
consistent with an airport of its age; 
i. shrinkage and cracks by themselves do not indicate a lack 
of maintenance but are just a result of natural aging; 
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j . he had no reason to believe that the weeds or drainage 
issues he observed posed any kind of hazard; 
k. the Airport was in fairly good condition compared to the 
other runways he has inspected. 
[See id.] 
44. Craig Ide, one of the Association's experts and the person in 
charge of inspecting the pavement at municipal airports across the state on 
behalf of the aeronautical division of the Utah Department of Transportation, 
testified that the Airport rated a 69 or "good" on the Pavement Condition 
Index. [See Exhibit 161 (Craig Ide Affidavit) at ^ 7.] 
45. Mr. Ide testified that the average score for municipal airports in 
2003 was 59. [Id.] 
46. With respect to the lighting on the Airport, Mr. Longley 
conceded that the lighting system was a military surplus system, which he 
bought on the cheap and installed himself. [See Longley Testimony.] 
47. All the evidence introduced established that, while the lighting 
system was showing its age, it was generally kept in good working order—at 
least in the same condition as when it was installed, "normal wear and tear 
excepted,"11 as permitted by the Lease. [See Exhibit 1 (Lease) at ]f 8; Holt 
Testimony; Batson Affidavit; McCarroll Testimony.] 
48. In addition to witnesses for the Association, another one of Mr. 
Longley's experts, Ryan Christensen, testified that, although there were some 
lights on the airport that needed replacing and others that needed cleaning and 
polishing, the lighting system worked when tested and performed the function 
is was designed to perform. [See Ryan Christensen testimony.] 
49. Mr. Christensen acknowledged that when he was deposed shortly 
after inspecting the runway in late 2003 he testified that he "wouldn't be 
concerned about" landing on the Airport at night. [See id.] 
11
 Normal wear and tear is a significant factor to be kept in mind as it relates to the 
Airport and the lighting system in particular given the testimony of the harsh desert 
conditions that plagued the Airport. [See Longley Testimony; Christensen Testimony; 
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5 0. There are no lights on any of the taxiway s, except for those in the 
FBO area owned and controlled by Mr. Longley. [see Brewer Testimony.] 
51. Any lights on the Airport that were broken in March 2003, were 
subsequently and timely repaired by the Association. [See Murdock 
Testimony.] 
52. At least one witness, a pilot and real estate expert who no longer 
has ties to any party in this matter, testified that he inspected the Airport at the 
very time Mr. Longley alleged it was in disarray and concluded that the Airport 
was in good condition and decided to purchase a lot in the community based 
thereon. [See Holt Testimony.] 
53. Another witness, a pilot with no continuing ties to any party, 
testified that he also inspected the Airport around this same time and found it 
to be in "very good condition." [See Brewer Testimony.] 
54. At no time have maintenance issues affected flight operations or 
compromised the safety of those using the Airport in any way. [ See Longley 
Testimony; Murdock Testimony; Brewer Testimony; Holt Testimony, 
McCarroll Testimony; Habberfield Affidavit; Batson Affidavit and 
Santosuosso Affidavit.] 
62. Mr. Longley also asserted that the Association has failed to meet 
the "necessary insurance requirements" outlined in the lease. Once again, 
however, Mr. Longley did not specify what insurance requirements were not 
met other than to assert that the Association failed to seek his approval and 
provide him a copy of the policy. [See Exhibit 2 (Notice) at 2.] 
63. Once the Association was apprised of Mr. Longley's concerns, 
it immediately made arrangements to have a copy of the insurance policy 
forwarded to Mr. Longley. [See Murdock Testimony.] 
64. In fact, in his Final Notice, Mr. Longley states: "A mere 
statement in Lessee's counsel's letter of April 15, 2003 that the required 
insurance has been maintained and that a copy of the same is now belatedly 
being provided, is not enough." [See Exhibit 4 (Final Notice) at 2, *f 3.] 
65. Contrary to Mr. Longley's statement, providing a copy of the 
insurance policy after being given notice of the outstanding need to do so is 
precisely what is contemplated in the Lease's notice and cure provision. 
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Moreover, the Association had little ability to cure its alleged failure to seek 
Mr. Longley's prior approval of the policy until it was time to renew the 
policy. 
66. There is no evidence in the record that the Association failed to 
do this after being put on notice by Mr. Longley. 
72. Finally, Mr. Longley asserted that the Association's current lease 
payment was past due, but no evidence was presented at trial and no mention 
of any outstanding or delinquent lease payments was even made at trial. 
73. Despite the deficiencies in Mr. Longley's allegations about the 
Airport, Mr. Longley sent a letter to the Association shortly after purportedly 
terminating the lease, stating: "Grassy Meadows Airport, Inc. [the lessor] has 
no desire to prohibit lot owners [the Association] from use of the runway . .. 
." [See Exhibit 283 (Duane Ostler Letter of June 6, 2003).] 
74. The Association thus continued to use the Airport virtually 
uninterrupted and has continued to use the Airport over the past seven-plus 
years without accident or undesirable incident of any kind. [See Longley 
Testimony.] 
75. Mr. Longley has made no further assertions of breach by the 
Association during this time. [See Longley Testimony.] 
R. 741 at 10-17. 
Despite this overwhelming evidence, Sky Ranch asserts that the trial court clearly 
erred in finding that the Association substantially complied with its obligations under the 
lease. In so arguing, Sky Ranch does not assert that the above findings are not supported by 
sufficient evidence. Rather, it simply points to other evidence presented at trial that supports 
Sky Ranch's position. However, this in no way demonstrates that the trial court acted clearly 
erroneously in concluding that the evidence in support of substantial compliance outweighed 
the evidence in support of material breach. 
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Indeed, much of Sky Ranch's evidence of material breach is simply unpersuasive. For 
example, permeating throughout Sky Ranch's case is the argument that Sky Ranch failed in 
its "maintenance" obligation to repave the runway. E.g., Brief of Appellant at 34. Sky 
Ranch thus argues: "The Lease did not provide for Sky Ranch to repave the runway—all 
maintenance responsibilities were in the hands of the Association." Id. at 36. In fact, 
resurfacing the runway is not included among any of the Association's maintenance 
responsibilities. R. 375a, Ex. 1, § 8 (detailing duty to "paint, level, compact, remove weeds, 
repair and oil the surface," but not resurface the runway). Rather, the Lease designated 
resurfacing as an "improvement," which the Association had the discretion to perform only 
if it wanted to. R. 375a, Ex. 1, § 6 ("Lessee may make improvements to the common areas, 
such as resurfacing the runway ") (emphasis added). It is not surprising, therefore, that 
the trial court was unpersuaded by Sky Ranch's arguments, especially in light of the 
overwhelming evidence showing that the Association complied with all its contractual 
obligations to Sky Ranch. 
2. Sky Ranch did not prove that it suffered any injury. 
The second issue to analyze in determining whether or not a breach is material is to 
determine if the injured party can be adequately compensated for the benefits of which it was 
deprived. As set forth above, however, Sky Ranch was not deprived of any benefit under the 
lease. The Association (1) made all its lease payments; (2) maintained the airstrip in 
significantly better condition than the average municipal airport; and (3) corrected the 
clerical error resulting in Sky Ranch not being a named insured before Sky Ranch ever 
incurred any liability related to the airstrip. 
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In fact, the only evidence Sky Ranch put on in the entire trial regarding damages it 
allegedly incurred was Mr. Longley's cursory testimony that he "spent about $12,000" on 
cleaning up weeds and oiling fences. R. 755 at 22:16-20. However, Sky Ranch never 
produced any receipts or other documents to substantiate Mr. Longley's testimony.12 Id. at 
48:18-19. Thus, there is no credible evidence that Sky Ranch was harmed at all by any of 
the alleged breaches. Moreover, even if there were, Sky Ranch could easily be compensated 
for this loss by an award of damages. The availability of this standard remedy eliminates the 
justification for the drastic remedy of forfeiture.13 
3. The Association would be damaged significantly if the Lease 
were terminated. 
The Association would suffer greatly if the Lease were terminated. The very purpose 
for the development was to have access to a private airstrip. R. 741 at 2-3, t1f 5-7. If access 
to the airstrip were now denied, the sole purpose for the development's existence would be 
eliminated, airplane hangars built by the Association's members would have no use, 
transportation to and from the development would be restricted and property values would 
decrease significantly. These reasons weigh strongly against forfeiture. 
Mr. Longley initially claimed he had the receipts in a "file somewhere" but then 
accused his attorney of losing them only to finally admit that he did not know where they 
were—all in the same sentence. R. 755 at 48:21-23. 
13
 This is not to say that Sky Ranch was, in fact, damaged. It had the burden to prove 
its damages with "reasonable certainty." Cook Associates, Inc. v. Utah Sch. & Institutional 
Trust Lands Admin., 2010 UT App 284,136,243 P.3d 888 ("[Claimant] must also prove the 
fact of damage with reasonable certainty, and the amount of damages may not be 
speculative.") (citations omitted). Mr. Longley's unsubstantiated testimony fell far short of 
this standard.. Thus, this Court should also affirm the trial court's decision not to award any 
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4. The Association has already cured whatever minor 
deficiencies that may have existed. 
The question regarding the likelihood that the Association will cure its alleged 
breaches also weighs against forfeiture. This case provides a unique insight into this factor 
given that the Association has already cured all the alleged deficiencies. Indeed, Sky Ranch 
has not alleged any further deficiencies during the eight-plus years that have passed since it 
served its Notice of Termination on the Association in March of 2003. During this time the 
Association has continued to use the airstrip with Sky Ranch's acquiescence as it did during 
the 12 years preceding Sky Ranch's Notice, all without incident of any kind. 
5. The Association always acted in good faith. 
Despite whatever deficiencies that may have existed in the Association's efforts to 
comply with its obligations under the Lease, the evidence showed that the Association always 
acted in good faith. First, it must be noted that whatever deficiencies that may have existed 
were temporary or otherwise de minimis in nature. Moreover, as Sky Ranch itself noted, the 
Association engaged in "frenzied" efforts to cure the maintenance deficiencies once Sky 
Ranch brought them to the Association's attention. R. 741 at 10, ^ 36-38. The Court also 
found that the Association "exercised good faith efforts to name Mr. Longley' s development 
entity, Sky Ranch Development, Inc., as an additional insured in a timely fashion after being 
notified of the fact that the entity, for whatever reason, had been omitted as an additional 
insured." Id. at 16, fflf 67-69. 
The best evidence of good faith, however, lies in the fact that the Association has now 
operated the airstrip for over twenty years without any incident being attributed to 
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insufficient maintenance of any kind, and that with the exception of one brief period in 
2003—at a time when the Association was resisting Sky Ranch's commercial development 
efforts—Sky Ranch has never asserted that the Association's has been lacking in its 
maintenance responsibilities or other obligations under the lease. 
In short, far from clearly erring, the trial court correctly found that any breach of the 
Lease that may have occurred was immaterial and that termination of the Lease would be 
inappropriate in light of the substantial compliance doctrine. Cache County, 1999 UT App 
134 at ^} 28, 35-38; see also State Dept. of Human Services ex rel Parker v. Irizarry, 945 
P.2d 676,678 (Utah 1997) ("An appellate court will not reverse the findings of fact of a trial 
court sitting without a jury unless they are against the clear weight of the evidence, thus 
making them clearly erroneous.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). The trial court 
also correctly held that Sky Ranch was not entitled to any monetary damages. 
C. Sky Ranch Has Failed to Marshal the Evidence. 
Finally, Sky Ranch has failed in its responsibility to marshal all the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings. The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure state that "[a] 
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." UTAHR. APP. P. 24(a)(9). The Utah Court of Appeals has elaborated 
on this requirement: 
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual findings lightly. We 
repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear when 
challenging factual findings. To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of 
fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. "[Attorneys] must 
extricate [themselves] from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's 
position. In order to properly discharge the [marshaling] duty . . . , the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap 
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of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists." Once appellants have established every pillar supporting 
their adversary's position, they then "must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence" and show why those pillars fail to support the trial court's findings. 
They must show the trial court's findings are "so lacking in support as to be 
'against the clear weight of the evidence/ thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous.'" 
Oneida/SLIC, 872 P.2d at 1052-53 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Chipman 
v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (noting appellant's requirement to 
marshal all the evidence and then show that "the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable 
to the trial court, is legally insufficient to support the contested finding"). 
In this case, Sky Ranch has only cited to the trial court's findings. Sky Ranch has 
failed to marshal the actual record evidence supporting those findings. For example, as 
indicated by the detailed citations supporting each of its findings, the trial court relied on a 
number of affidavits and deposition transcripts admitted at trial, none of which were 
marshaled by Sky Ranch. Sky Ranch has also failed to marshal other record evidence not 
cited by the trial court that provides additional support to its findings. Because Sky Ranch 
has failed in its duty to marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings, this 
Court should not countenance Sky Ranch's argument that the trial court's findings were 
clearly erroneous.14 
14
 For these same reasons, this Court should disregard Sky Ranch's argument that the 
trial court blindly adopted the Association's proposed findings of fact. Sky Ranch failed to 
marshal Plaintiffs actual proposed findings, which compared to the trial court's findings, 
reveal no fewer than 42 changes made by the trial court. The changes range from minor to 
major, and they all reveal the tedious process the trial court underwent in scrutinizing and 
modifying the proposed findings before adopting the modified version as his own. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADJUDICATED THE ENTIRETY OF SKY 
RANCH'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM. 
Finally, Sky Ranch asserts the trial court erred in determining that the Association had 
paid all the lease payments to which Sky Ranch was entitled under the Lease because this 
issue was not before the court. Again, Sky Ranch's assertion is not supported by the facts 
of this case. As discussed throughout this brief, Sky Ranch brought a counterclaim against 
the Association for breach of the Lease. R. 489 at 5,1} 16. In support of this claim, Sky 
Ranch incorporated its Notice of Termination of Lease. Id. The Notice, in turn, alleged: 
"Breach of section 3, lease fee. The lease fee specified in section 3 has frequently been 
overdue over the years, and is currently past due." Id. at Exhibit 2 (R. 375a, Ex. 2 at 2, f 4). 
That Sky Ranch failed to put on any evidence at trial in support of this claim does not mean 
the trial court erred in adjudicating the same. Indeed, the trial court would have been derelict 
in its duty not to resolve all the issues relating to Sky Ranch's claim. 
In any event, were this claim not properly before the trial court for some reason, the 
trial court's ruling would constitute harmless error given the doctrine of res judicata and Sky 
Ranch's obligation to assert all compulsory counterclaims arising "out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim." Utah R. Civ. P. 13(a). 
The Association's Complaint sought relief under a number of different causes of action based 
on the premise that it had not breached the Lease in any way and it was therefore improper 
of Sky Ranch to try to terminate the same. R. 1. Thus, the issue of breach was squarely a 
part of the complaint's subject-matter, and Sky Ranch had the obligation to raise all 
counterclaims in response to that issue or waive the right to raise them in a separate action. 
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Raile Family Trust ex rel. Raile v. Promax Dev. Corp., 2001 UT 40, f 12, 24 P.3d 980. 
Thus, whether bound by the trial court's judgment that the Lease was not breached for lack 
of payment or precluded to raise this issue in a separate action, the effect is the same and 
would therefore constitute harmless error. Jones, 944 P.2d at 360. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's findings and 
judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ c ? day October, 2011. 
HOOLE & KING, L.C. 
Gregory N. Hoole 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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know how to charge for the commercial areas and so forth. 
It's just that we hadn't had any commercial areas, but in 
'93 we had a fellow that owned a lot out at Sky Ranch that 
was actually an aircraft mechanic that wanted to put a 
building up there at Sky Ranch. 
I've never talked to you about this before, Craig. 
And so he had a building that it's actually at the 
Hurricane airport right now, and he wanted to put it in up 
there, and so we started to get together with the board to 
draft up these agreements. At the same time we did another 
set of agreements, and these were all signed at the same 
time. 
MR. SMITH: I guess I would just move for admission 
of Exhibit 7. 
MR. HOOLE: We object, Your Honor. Exhibit 7 I 
don't think is an executed contract. If you look at the 
signature lines, for the association it's written in by 
someone, Al Conger or Paul Mathias or Mathis. And then if 
you look through the document, it's red lined with all sorts 
of corrections and annotations. 
It looks like this was a work in progress. In 
fact, that's our understanding is that this was a work in 
progress. It was never a fully executed or even agreed to 
document, so we would object on that basis. 
THE COURT: It is in the stipulated group. 
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MR. HOOLE: No, Your Honor. As Mr. Smith began to 
talk this morning, this binder he thought contained a bunch 
of stipulated documents. As Mr. Preston corrected him, it 
actually has some that are not stipulated, and this is one of 
them that we certainly do not stipulate to its authenticity 
or validity. 
THE COURT: Can Mr. Longley tell us more about this 
document that's here? 
BY MR. SMITH: 
Q Can you just tell us more about this document and 
how it came to be? 
A Yeah. So then we started working on this. It took 
us maybe a year or a little less than a year, maybe a little 
more, and it was basically drafts that went back and forth 
between the board and myself. And like I say, it had to do 
with a lot of other important documents that they were 
interested in getting, like water connections that I gave 
them. Also when we included the runway safety — the 10-acre 
runway safety zone at the end that I bought the property for 
and everything. 
Q Did you perform your obligations under this 
agreement? 
A Yes, I did. And we've got copies of the notes and 
the meeting minutes that show that this was done and approved 
to be signed and so forth. In fact, it was signed. 
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you see that says (inaudible) board of trustees meeting 
minutes July 9, 1994? 
A No, I didn't see that. Let me find that. You've 
got those, huh? 
Q Look at Exhibit 201. 
A I see you guys have everything organized properly. 
Q Identify Exhibit 201 for us. 
A 201 is one of the meeting minutes that reflect this 
dated July 9, 1994. 
Q What's important about that date? 
A Well, it's a date when — let me look at it a 
second here. 
Q Let me have you go to page 3 of Exhibit 201. 
A All right, yes. This is when — yeah, they had a 
MR. HOOLE: I have to object on foundation. The 
first page of the exhibit says that Mr. Longley was absent 
that day, so I think his rendering of any testimony regarding 
this exhibit is beyond his ability. 
THE WITNESS: It says that I wasn't there at the 
meeting? 
MR. HOOLE: That's what it says. 
THE WITNESS: Yeah, I don't think I was either. 
MR. SMITH: I just move for the admission of the 
exhibit. 
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going to work to put documents together in binders and all 
that kind of stuff, and with some of the documents we could 
stipulate as to authenticity to expedite things, but we were 
reserving all objections on whether it be hearsay or 
relevance or what ever. And Your Honor, I!m sure, has tried 
many, many cases. It's impracticable for an attorney to 
raise every conceivable objection to a document prior to — 
even if they don't raise an objection, which we did, and no 
court is going to allow documents to come into trial without 
some foundation that's laid. I don't think that's waived in 
this case, Your Honor. 
MR. SMITH: Your Honor, that's exactly what the 
rules apply for, so we don't waste all this time laying 
foundation on documents that there's no really real objection 
to foundation. 
THE COURT: Well, there is a real objection to the 
foundation for this document. It's not a final document. It 
purports to be an agreement, but it's not signed. 
MR. SMITH: I'm not talking about that document. 
THE COURT: But you're talking about a document 
you're trying to use to then provide the foundation for 
another one. If you can show me in those minutes even if 
they were entered that say this document with all this 
scribbling on it is a final document or is an accurate 
expression of the parties' agreement, I'll be really 
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surprised. And so — 
MR. SMITH: Can I read (inaudible), Your Honor? 
THE COURT: I don't know whether it's appropriate 
to do that either. Ifm looking at the pretrial order. All 
it says is exchange lists of witnesses and proposed exhibits. 
It doesn't say anything about objections. 
MR. HOOLE: And why is it so, Your Honor? 
MR. SMITH: Your Honor, we've already argued the 
point. How many times are we going to argue the same point 
over? 
• THE COURT: Calm yourself, Mr. Smith. It's not 
that big a deal. I don't see anything in the pretrial order 
that cuts one way or the other on that. 
THE WITNESS: We've got more stuff that show that 
that's a good document. 
THE COURT: So the answer to my question is nobody 
is really sure where even there is an original of this 
document, this agreement regarding development of FBO area 
and other phases, with original ink on it. 
MR. HOOLE: That's true. 
THE COURT: All anybody has is a copy of what ever 
that thing was that has been identified so far as not a final 
document and not a legibly signed document. You're referring 
to page 4 on these minutes. 
MR. SMITH: Page 3, Your Honor. What that shows, 
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Your Honor, is that they did agree to an FBO improvement. 
That!s the assent that they were just saying never existed 
and couldn't show. It's right there in that document. 
That!s why they don!t want the document in. 
THE COURT: It doesn't show that that document 
existed. It shows that a document existed. "Provided a 
current Attachment A is made part of the document and 
provided there is at the end the landowners association 
acknowledges responsibility," and I don't know if that 
language is even in this thing. What about that? Have you 
tried to stitch these two document together? The minutes say 
provided there's added to the end of Paragraph 4, quote, the 
landowners association, and there's an indication there that 
says add sentence on draft page 3. 
I really don't see what this exhibit does for me, 
Mr. Smith. 
THE WITNESS: We have other documents — 
MR. SMITH: (inaudible). What it does for you it 
shows that back in 1994, eight years before 2002, that the 
association was agreed to allow commercial use they now claim 
is in violation of the CC&Rs. 
THE COURT: Mr. Longley can testify to that from 
his own knowledge. Again, I'm not certain that this document 
itself helps because this isn't the agreement. This is 
something that might have led to the agreement, but this 
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isn't the agreement itself. It's evidence that they talked 
about an agreement. There's evidence in the minutes, if they 
were admitted, that they talked about and approved an 
agreement if it had this and if it had that, and we don't 
even have a draft copy that has the this and that from the 
minutes. So it's just not really connected. 
MR. SMITH: I withdraw Exhibit 7. I am going to 
move for the admission of Exhibit 201 because I think I'm 
entitled to have that in evidence. 
MR. HOOLE: Same objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Don't we have anybody who can give us 
foundation for minutes from the association? 
MR. SMITH: Not unless they object to it, Your 
Honor. That's why the rule says what it says. 
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because, again, I don't think it's a very practical 
provision, and I'll tell you why. It should be obvious. The 
way you employ that rule if you really want to be a pain or 
if you want to get away with something is you file in 
response to the rule 500 exhibits, and then give the party 15 
days to respond or 14 days or what ever it is to make 
objections to it. It's idiotic. People can't do that. 
That's not realistic. That's something some committee in 
Salt Lake thought was a really snazzy idea, and it's stupid. 
It doesn't work. So now in this case what do we get out of 
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR (435) 865-6895 H 6 
161 S. 200 W. Cedar City, UT 84720 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4-19-10 030501171 
that rule? Ifm just not — 
MR. SMITH: If I would have known we were going to 
have foundational objections, I would have noticed up 
witnesses to be able to be here to lay foundation. 
THE COURT: Wefve already talked about foundational 
testimony on other documents. Why were you not then saying I 
think Documents 1 through 35 and 202 through 319 and all 
these other piles of them? 
MR. SMITH: I thought we were past that. If I knew 
they were raising foundational objections admitting some of 
those documents, I would have raised foundational objections. 
I thought we were past that because I followed the rule. 
MR. HOOLE: I'm not sure what his exception for 
foundational objection. I know there's a rule that says all 
objections except for Rule 402 and 403 (inaudible) unless — 
MR. SMITH: (inaudible). 
MR. HOOLE: Excuse me. Unless there a pretrial 
order says differently or unless the parties stipulate to 
admit. 
MR. SMITH: Don't say we stipulated. (inaudible). 
MR. HOOLE: I'm not about to say that, Your Honor. 
I know Mr. Smith is pretty excited about this, and my 
apologies to the extent that Mr. Smith didn't understand that 
we were reserving all objections, but we told you we were 
reserving all objections with respect — 
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about it, that he — 
Q That's fine. 
A A lot it was that. 
Q So your testimony is that 1997 creates the LLC 
though had nothing to do with the filing of the 2002 CC&Rs 
(inaudible)? 
A Absolutely not. 
Q If I can refer to the bylaws very, very quick. I 
have a blown-up copy here. I believe they're Tab 12 in the 
combined binder. We talked about briefly earlier the changes 
that came out of 2002 CC&Rs. This is the recorded — 
actually I take that back. The bylaws have this 
parenthetical here down at the bottom. I understand the 
association has been operating under those for years and 
years and years that Class B membership automatically ceased 
on or about June 16, 1994. Now, I will acknowledge that in 
and of itself is nothing. Is this your signature here on the 
last page? 
A It sure is. 
Q Why did you sign it? Why did you allow your Class 
B votes to go away? 
A Have's you ever seen how big Al Conger is? 
Q That's all I wanted to ask on that question. 
A I objected in the meeting to — 
Q All I wanted to know is that your signature. 
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see if it was safe and check out the runway lights — well, 
the lighting system came after that, but I had a couple of 
things done. It's been a long time now. 
Q And why don't you go to Exhibit 207. 
THE COURT: Were you going to offer 293? 
MR. SMITH: Yeah, we'll offer 293. 
MR. HOOLE: No objection. 
THE COURT: 293 is received. 
(Thereupon, Trial Exhibit 293 
was admitted into evidence.) 
BY MR. SMITH: 
Q What does Exhibit 207 show? 
A That's a very nice shot — those are a couple of 
guys I hired from Job Service to clean up weeds and probably 
Q How much money did you spend to clean up the weeds 
(inaudible)? 
A Between cleaning up the weeds and oiling the 
fences, buying a bunch of oil or some of the oil and hiring 
different people to come out there, I spent about $12,000. 
Q Go to Exhibit 208 and ask if you can identify that 
exhibit. 
A Yeah. That is — these are pictures taken after 
the other ones were taken because we had gone through and 
cleaned it up. See there's a guy walking down the runway 
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THE COURT: Well, I think that, Mr. Richards, is an 
argument you can make just based on the documents without 
asking Mr. Longley about it unless there's some relevance to 
his view of them. 
MR. RICHARDS: I will leave that as the document 
stands for itself. 
BY MR. RICHARDS: 
Q You indicated — I believe you indicated that after 
the cure period expired, you hired some folks or gentlemen to 
help clean up the weeds, and you paid them about $12,000; is 
that correct? 
A No. 
Q What was your testimony? 
A I hired about seven guys to help clean up the 
weeds, and altogether with all the activities I did during 
that period of time, hiring engineers and others, it cost 
about $12,000. 
Q Do you have any receipts that would evidence that? 
A Yes. I don't have them with me though. 
Q (inaudible)? 
A No. I think they're in a file somewhere. I think 
I gave them to Craig, and he lost them. I don't know. 
They're somewhere. 
Q I'd like to turn your attention to the insurance 
policy that was discussed just a moment ago. We've already 
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enough time to do it today. If therefs enough time, we can 
push forward; otherwise, maybe we can come back on a morning 
next week or so and do closing arguments. 
THE COURT: That's a possibility. 
MR. SMITH: Wefve got some — I don't know that we 
can get it done quite that quickly, Your Honor. I!d like to 
think we could, but I donft think we could, and I would 
prefer just waiting until another day that we can come put on 
our evidence on that. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then do you want me to try to 
work up some — of course, starting with your proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, do you want me to do 
those on the part of the trial I've heard, or do you want to 
reserve all of that and have one set of findings and 
conclusions; 
MR. SMITH: I was going to say go forward. 
MR. HOOLE: I think based on evidence that's come 
in, I would probably request submit a revised version. But I 
think I need to conform some of those findings that I would 
propose to the Court based upon the evidence that's actually 
been admitted so. 
THE COURT: And then do that and then later try, if 
necessary, the issue of damages and tortious interference? 
MR. SMITH: Tortious interference I think is in 
play no matter what we do. 
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was specifically provided in the declaration. That is 
exactly what the restatement of property says in every case 
that has applied to that restatement in a courtroom and has 
come to the exact same conclusion. 
So we would submit, Your Honor, that not only is 
the declaration void because of the unambiguous language that 
says notwithstanding any other provision you can't amend once 
you pass the 80 percent threshold, but the proposed 2002 
declaration — not proposed. He filed it, and recorded it. 
The 2002 declaration was so far removed from the original 
plan and intent of that community that it would be void under 
all applicable law. 
Tortious interference was the next thing that I was 
going to address. There hasn't bee^ n evidence on this point, 
but I believe I can make a brief argument by way of strict 
application of the law as far as (inaudible) is concerned. 
And the reason I think I can do this is regardless of what 
testimony comes in as to planning commissions and what the 
association did, the association is immune — it's citizens 
are immune from liability for engaging in governing process, 
engaging in local process. The Utah Supreme Court is very 
clear on this point. 
To quote, the Court says, The First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution guarantees citizens the right 
to, quote, petition the government for a redress grievances. 
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In recognition of this right, the United States Supreme Court 
has held that individuals and organizations — and the reason 
I emphasize organization is because I thought I heard an 
argument in the restatement that First Amendment rights only 
apply to individuals, but the United States Supreme Court, as 
quoted by the Utah Supreme Court, says individuals and 
organizations are immune from liability and from antitrust 
laws for actions constituting petitions to the government. 
And then the Court goes on and says, Over the years 
courts have extended this immunity doctrine referred to 
(inaudible) doctrine to protect political activity against 
tort claims as well as antitrust claims. And this quote came 
from a case where members of an association were getting sued 
for tortious interference because they opposed zoning 
ordinance changes, exactly what has happened in this case. 
So we would submit summarily that even regardless of what 
ever evidence is introduced by Mr. Longley, that claim must 
fail. 
Let me just now move to the contract that we've 
heard so much about. And I want to emphasize, Your Honor, in 
talking about the lease that we're not talking strictly about 
a breach of contract here. What we're talking about, Your 
Honor, is the termination provision, sometimes referred to in 
the law as a forfeiture provision. So what we're really 
talking about is what is the proper remedy. 
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say, well, hefd be in the position if he got the lease 
terminated who else is he going to lease the place to? Itfs 
a Mexican standoff, Your Honor. He can't pick up the runway 
and take it somewhere else and market it somewhere else. The 
only people that he could lease or let use the runway are the 
people that live. He doesn't have any choice on that. He 
doesn't have any way to do that. 
Okay, let's take a minute and talk about the, 
quote, citizen's right of redress. I think there's confusion 
here, Your Honor. We're confusing the fact that the 
association last time I checked wasn't a citizen. We're not 
suing Mr. Ron what ever his name was that went out there — 
you know, trying to stop this. We haven't even gotten all 
that evidence on. I think it's all premature because we 
haven't had a chance to put our evidence on about tortious 
interference. 
But let me think. Did we say anybody — again, 
people can go do things. I think I said this in my opening. 
I thought I cleared this up, but I guess not. People can go 
and exercise their constitutional rights. No doubt about 
that. There's Utah case involving Anderson (inaudible). 
Those people had (inaudible) agreement. Now, they claim they 
weren't in agreement. Mr. Longley the only testimony we 
heard is that there was an agreement. I didn't hear anybody 
say there wasn't an agreement, and that (inaudible). He said 
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he performed on it. Did we hear any evidence that he didn't 
perform on it? Partial performance, we don't have to have a 
written agreement. 
Let's see what else did he say? He said that the 
head of the association came over and took his copy that was 
signed and never gave it back. I think that's called 
spoliation of evidence in this state, but, you know, put all 
those together. Mr. Longley doesn't hold all the cards, and 
there's not all of that sort of thing. 
Now we have to talk about materiality of the 
covenant defaults. Let's talk about that for a minute. 
First of all, let's read the lease the way it's written. I 
never saw any clause in the lease that said you only had to 
maintain the airport to allow (inaudible) safe. That's not 
in the lease. Again, let's go back to the documents 
themselves. Let's don't spend our time making up language 
that isn't there. That's what's happened here. They say, 
well, we think it's quote safe, so no harm no foul. We 
believe the runway was safe. 
Well, also they have two depositions in record, one 
of Jesse Debusschere and one Nick Berg. Both of those who 
are residents of Sky Ranch said they felt that there was 
problems with the lights. The bigger problems they said they 
sometimes shut off, shut on, sometimes it works and wouldn't 
work. And how much maintenance did we have of the lights? 
MARY BETH COOK, CSR, RPR (435) 865-6895 206 
161 S. 200 W. Cedar City, UT 84720 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
